Lord Grenville and the 'smoking gun'’: The plot to assinate the French directory in 1798–1799 reconsidered by Durey, M.
Lord Grenville and the 'Smoking Gun': The Plot to Assassinate the French Directory in 1798-
1799 Reconsidered
Author(s): Michael Durey
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 547-568
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3133496 .
Accessed: 05/03/2013 21:27
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Historical Journal.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded  on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 21:27:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThe Historical  Journal,  45, 3 (2002),  pp. 547-568  ?  2002  Cambridge University Press 
DOI:  Io. I17/Soo008246Xo2002546  Printed in the United Kingdom 
LORD  GRENVILLE  AND  THE 
'SMOKING  GUN':  THE  PLOT  TO 
ASSASSINATE  THE  FRENCH 
DIRECTORY  IN  1798-1799 
RECONSIDERED* 
MICHAEL  DUREY 
Murdoch University 
ABSTRACT.  This  article  re-examines  the  evidence  that  has  been  used  to  claim  that,  in the  aftermath 
of the  collapse  of the  British  secret  service's  counter-revolutionary  plans  in France  in September  I797, 
foreign  secretary  Lord  Grenville  supported  a French  royalist  plot to assassinate  the Directory.  It 
concludes  that,  although  his agent  James Talbot  was actively  involved  and  probably  thought  he had 
official  permission  to proceed,  Grenville  remained  ignorant  of the  plot until December  i798. He 
subsequently  ordered  Talbot  to  withdraw  from  the  conspiracy.  Emphasis  is  placed  on  communications 
difficulties  associated  with undercover  secret  service  activities in this era and on bureaucraticfailures 
within the  foreign office,  together  with evidence  to suggest that Talbot was temperamentally  unsuited 
to the  role  of intelligence  officer. 
I 
Around  I8Io,  after  his  active  political  career  as a government  minister  had 
come  to  an  end,  William,  Lord  Grenville  embarked  on  his  memoirs.  He 
described  the wars against  revolutionary  and Napoleonic  France,  which for the 
British had begun  in February  1793, as 'Wars of unusual  duration  and ferocity; 
Anarchy  and civil  bloodshed,  exiles,  proscriptions,  assassinations,  and judicial 
murders,  the worst species  of the worst  crime.  1 The  wars were fought  in new 
ways,  not  only  with  competing  ideologies  and  innovative  strategies  and 
battlefield  tactics, but also with the silent weapons  of clandestine  secret services. 
As  foreign  secretary  in  William  Pitt's  ministry,  Grenville  played  a  major 
guiding  role in this underground  war, using British diplomats  and secret agents 
to  gather  intelligence  and  to  provide  aid  to  the  internal  enemies  of 
revolutionary  France.  This  secret  war  was  to become  increasingly  unscrupu- 
lous,  reaching  a  peak  with  the  Cadoudal  plot  to  assassinate  first  consul 
*  I would like to thank Greg Brotherson, Simon Burrows, Thomas Munch-Petersen, and Ian 
Waterston for their advice and assistance. The research for this article was funded by a Large 
Grant from the Australian Research Council. 
1 William, Lord Grenville, 'Commentaries of my own political life and of public transactions 
connected with it', British Library (BL) Add. MS 69130, p. 5, quoted in A. D. Harvey, Collision  of 
empires:  Britain  in three  world  wars, 1793-i945 (London, 1992),  p. xi. 
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Bonaparte  in  I803-4  and the subsequentjudicial  murder of the duc d'Enghien 
and the mysterious  deaths  of Gen.  Pichegru  and Capt. John  Wesley  Wright  in 
the Temple  prison  in Paris.2 
These  events  occurred  while  Grenville  was in opposition,  but recently  it has 
been  claimed  that  the  British  government,  under  Grenville's  auspices,  had 
been involved  in assassination  plots  as early  as  I798.  The  plot in question  was 
facilitated  by James  Talbot,  a secret  agent  operating  undercover  in  Swabia, 
who  sought  to  paralyse  the  executive  arm  of  the  revolutionary  French 
government  by financing  and promoting  a plan to assassinate  the five members 
of the Directory  and some of their ministers.  Talbot's  activities  have  long  been 
known  to historians,  but it has usually  been  thought  that  they were unofficial. 
Harvey  Mitchell,  for instance,  concluded  in  1965 that Grenville  was genuinely 
surprised and angry when he heard ofTalbot's  plotting.  Talbot  had apparently 
'gone  native',  being  tricked  by  extremist  royalists  into  supporting  a  coup de 
main.3  Elizabeth  Sparrow,  however,  in articles  and  a book which  benefit  from 
sources  unavailable  to  Mitchell,  has  now  suggested  that  Grenville  had 
supported  Talbot's  plan from its beginnings  and that he ordered its cancellation 
only  after  its  exposure  was  threatened.4  If  Sparrow  is  correct,  not  only  did 
Grenville  abandon  Talbot,  but he also deliberately  falsified  official  records  to 
hide his connection  with  'the  smoking  gun'.  Moreover,  any conspiracy  to hide 
embarrassing  evidence  must also have  included  at least  three other  officials in 
London:  George  Canning,  undersecretary  of state  at the foreign  office  (and  a 
future  prime  minister);  Brook  Taylor,  Grenville's  private  secretary  (and 
subsequently  a diplomat  on  foreign  service);  and  William  Wickham,  under- 
secretary  of state  at the home  office  (he later  was chief  secretary  in  Ireland). 
The  purpose  of this article  is to re-examine  the  evidence  relating  to James 
Talbot's  mission  in  Swabia  and  to reassess Grenville's  role in  its genesis  and 
outcome.  The  conclusions  reached  differ from both  Mitchell's  and  Sparrow's: 
Grenville  did not sanction  an assassination  plot  before Talbot  went  to Swabia 
and  remained  unaware  of its existence  until  December  1798;  and Talbot  was 
not  the  naive  victim  of  a  royalist  sting,  but  a  reckless  adventurer  who 
nevertheless  believed  that  he  was  acting  with  implicit  government  sanction. 
This  is the  tale  of  two  men,  one  anxious  to  maximize  the  benefits  of family 
clientage,  but who allows his enthusiasm  and ambition  to cloud  his judgement, 
and  another  who,  with  heavy  responsibilities  for  winning  the  war  against 
revolutionary  France,  set  a  limit  to  the  lengths  he  would  go  to  achieve  his 
counter-revolutionary  ends. 
2 Jean-Francois Chiappe, Georges  Cadoudal  ou  la liberte  (Paris, 1971);  Paul Lombard, Par le sang 
d'un  prince:  le duc  d'Enghien  (Paris, 1986); B. Saugier, Pichegru:  histoire  d'un  suicide  (Aubenas, 1992); 
Tom Pocock, A thirst  for glory: the  life of Admiral  Sir Sidney  Smith  (London, I996). 
3 Harvey  Mitchell,  The underground  war against revolutionary  France: the missions  of  William 
Wickham, I79  -18oo  (Oxford,  I965),  esp.  pp.  219-27. 
4 Elizabeth Sparrow,  "'The alien office, 1792  - 80o6',  HIistorical  Journal,  33 (1990), p. 373; idem, 
'The  Swiss and Swabian agencies, I795--I880',  Historical  Journal,  35 (1992),  pp. 861-84;  idem, 
Secret  service:  British  agents  in France,  I792-1815 (Woodbridge, 1999), esp. pp. 145-73. 
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II 
James Talbot's mission to Swabia came at a time when Britain's  fortunes  in the 
war with  revolutionary France were at  a low  ebb. Although  the country 
remained safe from invasion, a French army, under Napoleon Bonaparte's 
command, was being  established on  the  Channel coast. Britain had  only 
recently survived a  major financial crisis and serious naval mutinies. The 
British fleet had been forced out of the Mediterranean; Ireland was bubbling 
up towards insurrection; and Britain's  last ally in Europe, Austria, had signed 
a treaty with Bonaparte at Campo Formio in October  797 and was currently 
engaged  in  further peace  negotiations in  the  German  town  of  Rastadt. 
Moreover, having forced by rough diplomatic means the removal from Berne 
of William Wickham, Britain's  minister  in Switzerland, the French were about 
to invade the cantons to establish the revolutionary Helvetic Republic. 
Wickham's return to London at the end of  I797 was a triumph for the 
French, for they knew he was Britain's  spymaster  on the continent, responsible 
for organizing and funding all the counter-revolutionary activities in eastern 
and southern France.5  From early 1795 he had been involved in attempts to co- 
ordinate insurrections in the French interior with an invasion by Austrian 
troops along the eastern border. More recently, he had supported royalists in 
their attempt to regain power by obtaining majorities in the two legislative 
conseils  in Paris. Wickham's retreat was a further blow to a secret service which 
in the preceding months had been badly hit by the destruction of spy networks 
in Paris and by the Directory's coup d'etat against the conseils in September 
(Fructidor). The arrest and deportation of many royalist leaders followed the 
collapse of eighteen months of counter-revolutionary  planning and plotting.6 
Wickham left his assistant  James Talbot as charge  d'affaires  in Berne, with 
orders to feign breaking contact with French royalist organizations, while at 
the same time secretly ensuring that these links remained intact for future use.7 
As secretary of legation in  the Swiss mission since the previous February, 
Talbot had assisted Wickham in his clandestine activities.8 Although thirty 
years of age, he was inexperienced in the arts of diplomacy, both secret and 
open. He was the second son of Richard Talbot of Malahide Castle, County 
Dublin, scion of an ancient Roman Catholic family which had only recently 
5 Wickham left Berne for Frankfurt  on 7 Nov., ostensibly to visit Col. Charles  Gregan Craufurd, 
who was still recovering from a serious wound sustained at the battle of Amburg in  1796. He 
arrived in England in late December. Talbot to Canning, 7 Nov.  I797,  Bodleian Library, MS 
Talbot, c. I4; Portland to Camden, 4Jan.  1798, London, Public Record Office (PRO) HO Ioo/75, 
fo. 3; Wickham to Grenville, 29 Dec. 1797, The  correspondence  of the  right  honourable  William  Wickham 
(hereafter Wickham, Correspondence),  ed. William Wickham (2 vols., London, I870), 11,  p. 67. 
6  In addition to Mitchell's and Sparrow's  work, see W. R. Fryer, Republic  or  restoration  in France? 
I794-I797  (Manchester, i965);  Sir John Hall, General  Pichegru's  treason  (New York,  9  5). 
7  Talbot to Grenville, 9 Nov.  I797, cipher, MS Talbot, c.I4;  Wickham to Grenville, 29  Dec. 
1797, Wickham, Correspondence,  I,  p. 67. 
8  MS Talbot, c.  2, fo. 47; Wickham to Zurich Burgomasters, 15 Mar. 1797,  MS Talbot, b. 20. 
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converted  to Protestantism,  a sure sign of social  and political  ambitions.9  The 
Talbots  were distantly  related  to the Grenvilles  through  the marriage  of Mary 
Nugent  to  Grenville's  elder  brother,  the  marquess  of  Buckingham.10  The 
Grenvilles,  especially  Buckingham,  were insatiable  hunters of places,  sinecures, 
and  honours,  both  for  themselves  and  their  extended  family.1l  In  I793  the 
Talbots  entered  the  Grenvilles'  orbit,  when  Buckingham  brought  James 
Talbot's  elder  brother  Richard  to  Pitt's  attention  and  helped  him  in  his 
military  career.l2 James,  too,  after an  early  manhood  of complete  obscurity, 
was soon  vying  for Buckingham's  attention.  His  aim  was  to find  a position  in 
the  foreign  service  that  would  be  popular  'among  the  first  people  of  the 
country'  and might  lead  'to  the principal  objects  in the diplomatic  line'.13  In 
1795, while  staying  at Buckingham's  country  seat of Stowe,  he had given  such 
'very  great  assistance'  in  the  arrangements  for  a  family  marriage  -  he  had 
shown  'prudence  and  discretion  in  his  management  of  the  old  lady'-  that 
Buckingham  persuaded  Grenville  to  reward  him  with  a  job.14  Grenville 
initially  considered  sending  Talbot  to France  as a covert  commissioner  to the 
royalist  armies in the west.  Despite  recognizing  that  'the  enterprize  would  be 
attended  with  equal  if not  greater  personal  risque than  almost  any in which  I 
could  possibly  be  engaged',  Talbot  was  eager  to  go,  but,  in  the  event,  the 
mission  was abandoned  as being  too risky.15 This  was probably  fortunate,  for 
Talbot  had  been  indiscreet.  Not  only  did  he  leak  the  secret  to  his uncle,  Sir 
George  Nugent,  in Dublin,  but  he also asked for his mother  to be told. 
Instead,  Talbot,  in the lowly  position  of writing  clerk, accompanied  the earl 
of Malmesbury  to Paris on his first peace  mission  in October  1796.  There  he 
received  his first taste of clandestine  intrigue,  for, although  there were others in 
Malmesbury's  suite who were responsible for espionage  -  including  attempts  to 
negotiate  the  release  of  Sir  Sidney  Smith  from  the  Temple 
prison-  Malmesbury  was  prepared  to  use  Talbot  to  obtain  low-grade 
9  See, for example, Oliver MacDonagh, The  inspector  general:  Sir  Jeremiah  Fitzpatrick  and  the  politics 
of social  refJrm,  1783-1802  (London, 198I ), p. 22; Thomas Bartlett, Thefall and  rise  of the  Irish  nation: 
the  Catholic  question,  i69o-i83o (Dublin, 1992),  pp. 23, 112. 
l0 
John Beckett, The  rise  andfall of the  Grenvilles  (Manchester, I994), p. 67. 
11 James J.  Sack,  The Grenvillites,  180o-1829 (Urbana,  1979),  p.  37.  Thomas  Paine wrote 
caustically of Lord Grenville: 'This man ought to be as strong in the back as a mule, or the sire  of 
a mule, or it would crack with the weight of places and offices.' Thomas Paine, Letter  addressed  to 
the  addressers  on  the  late  proclamation  (  792),  in The  Writings  of Thomas  Paine,  ed. Moncure D. Conway 
(4 vols.,  New  York,  1967),  II,  p.  49. 
12  The  history  of  parliament:  the  House  of Commons,  i79o-i820,  ed. R. G. Thorne (5 vols., London, 
1986),  v,  331. 
13  Talbot to Gov. ISir George] Nugent, 2 June  1796,  MS Talbot, c. 12,  fo. i. 
14 Buckingham to Grenville, 24  Oct.  I795,  in Report  on the manuscripts  of J. B. Fortescue,  esq, 
preserved  at Dropmore  (hereafter  Dropmore  papers),  ed. Walter Fitzpatrick (I 2 vols., London, i899), tI, 
p.  143. 
15 Talbot to Nugent, 2 June 1796,  MS Talbot, c. I2, fo. i. The mission  was abandoned after the 
capture of Sir Sidney Smith, another Grenville relative involved in secret service. See Michael 
Durey, 'The British  secret service and the escape of Sir Sidney Smith from Paris in 1798', History, 
84  (1999),  PP. 437-57. 
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information on possible diplomatic contacts.16  Talbot himself on one occasion 
took an unnecessary  minor risk by walking around the walls of the Temple; he 
looked into the courtyard, 'but did not attempt to enter'. He took surreptitious 
pleasure in  being falsely accused by the Redacteur,  the official government 
newspaper, of  'having  been  the  head  of  a  bureau of  emigres and  to  be 
particularly acquainted with all the ancient noblesse of France'.7  The  two 
months that Talbot spent in Paris, where he gained Malmesbury's approval, 
were sufficient to persuade Grenville to send him  to Berne as Wickham's 
assistant.18 
Although  Talbot  recognized  that  his  isolated  position  in  Switzerland 
required  him to show  'a considerable  degree  of circumspection  and caution',19 
his activities  while  working  for Wickham  suggest  that he sometimes  had found 
difficulty  controlling  his adventurous  streak. Soon  after his arrival in Berne, he 
brought  attention  to himself  at a public  ball:  according  to an  amused  Brook 
Taylor,  it was reported  to London  that 'you  not only embraced  two ladies with 
whom  you  were  dancing  but  did  what  my  modesty  will  not  allow  me  to 
mention'.20  More  worryingly,  in  late  summer  and  without  Wickham's 
knowledge,  Talbot  obtained  a passport  as a Swiss merchant  and  travelled  to 
Milan,  passing through  two towns occupied  by French  troops and others which 
were  being  revolutionized.  His  aim,  to  see  'the  principal  lion of  the  place, 
General  Buonaparte',  was unfulfilled,  for the conqueror  of Italy was on his way 
to  the  peace  negotiations  at  Rastadt,  but  Talbot  did  visit Josephine  in  her 
palace.  After  waiting  several  hours,  he  finally  saw  her,  entering  the  room 
surrounded  by admiring  officers.  She was,  he thought,  'good  looking  but not 
handsome,  rather plainly  but becomingly  dressed and seemed  to be well in her 
manners'.  Not  wishing  'to  become  the companion  of M.  D'Antraigues'  -  the 
ultra-royalist  agent  whose  controversial  arrest  the  previous  year  had  under- 
mined  Wickham's  plans  in  Paris -  Talbot  slipped  away  without  drawing 
attention  to himself.21 
Such  reckless  escapades  suggest  that  Talbot  was  less suited  to  the  role  of 
spymaster,  which  required  tact,  caution,  and  the ability  to direct  policy  from 
the  shadows,  than  to  the  role  of the  adventurous  secret  agent.  Wickham,  to 
whom  Talbot  confessed  on his return,  nevertheless  expressed  confidence  in his 
subordinate's  capacity  to replace  him:  'whatever  is entrusted  to [Talbot]',  he 
told  Grenville,  'will  be  executed  with  equal  industry  and  discretion'.22 
16  Malmesbury to Grenville, 23 Oct.  I796,  Dropmore  papers,  III, pp. 262-3. 
17  Talbot's Diary, 28 Oct.  1796, MS Talbot, f.i,  fos. 12-13. 
18 
Malmesbury to Canning, 27 Oct. 1796, in Diaries  and  correspondence  of James  Harris,first  earl  of 
Malmesbury,  ed. Third Earl of Malmesbury (4 vols., London, i844), III,  p. 292. 
19 Talbot to Buckingham, I Nov.  1797, MS Talbot, c.  2,  fo. 68. 
20  Brook Taylor to Talbot,  I  Apr. 1797, MS Talbot, c. I2,  fo. 50.  21  Talbot  to Buckingham, 23  Sept.  I797,  MS Talbot, c.  2,  fos. 64-6.  For D'Antraigues, see 
Jacques Godechot, Le comte  D'Antraigues:  un espion  dans  l'Europe  des emigres  (Paris, 1986); Colin 
Duckworth, The D'Antraigues  phenomenon  (Newcastle, 1986). 
22  Wickham to Grenville, 29 Dec.  1797, Wickham, Correspondence,  II, p. 67. 
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Mindful,  like  Malmesbury before him,  of  Talbot's  connections with  the 
Grenville clan, Wickham was perhaps unwilling to expose any doubts he may 
have had about Talbot's suitability. If so, both he and Grenville would later 
regret  his reticence. 
III 
Ten days after  Wickham left Berne, Talbot drafted a private letter to Grenville. 
The final version was sent to London in cipher. Six days later, on 24 November, 
he  wrote  to  Brook Taylor,  mentioning  his  previous letter  to  Grenville. 
According  to  Sparrow,  these  letters  are  key  documents  to  support  her 
contention that, after Fructidor, the British government 'gave free rein to the 
most violent royalists,  with the result  that the reformed  [Swabian] agency, with 
its Paris  subsidiary,  was given backing to organise the assassination  of the whole 
of the directory'.23  To Grenville, Talbot offered his thoughts on the situation 
in the interior of France and unfolded a plan to overthrow the Directory. In his 
opinion, the vast majority of Frenchmen favoured changing the government, 
with most prepared to accept the restoration  of Louis XVIII.  If the legislative 
conseils  could find the means to overthrow the Executive Directory, they would 
be supported by the mass of the people, who sought only security and repose. 
Unfortunately, however, even though only four or five members  of the councils 
supported the Directory, the remainder were divided and had neither the 
resolution nor the courage to act. The solution, suggested Talbot, was for a 
band of resolute men to 'make themselves masters of the five Directors'. With 
power falling to the conseils,  the monarchy could then be proclaimed.24 
Three versions of this letter exist: a rough draft and a fair copy in Talbot's 
papers; and a deciphered version in Grenville's papers.25  In addition, a final 
copy of Talbot's letter to Taylor may be found among Talbot's papers.26  In 
this, Talbot suggested that he may have been irresponsible  in offering 'a very 
wicked project of mine' to Grenville. He therefore  asked Taylor, if he felt, after 
decipherment, that 'I have been guilty of a folly in the warmth of my zeal', not 
to pass on the letter of I8 November to Grenville.27  As the letter has found its 
way into Grenville's papers, it may be presumed either that Taylor received 
Talbot's letter too late to carry out his request, or that he did not believe that 
Grenville would find its contents objectionable.28 
From  this  cache  of  correspondence, Sparrow has  drawn  a  number  of 
important conclusions. First, she claims that 'Grenville's copy is identical with 
23 
Sparrow, 'Swiss and Swabian agencies', p. 862. 
24 Talbot to Grenville, I8 Nov.  1797, final draft, MS Talbot, c.I4. 
25 The deciphered version is in BL, Grenville papers, Add. MS 5901I  , fos. 129-37. 
26  Talbot to Taylor, 24  Nov. 1797, MS Talbot, c.I2,  fo. 70. 
27 Taylor,  as  Grenville's private  secretary, was  responsible for deciphering  private  cor- 
respondence. Canning was responsible  for deciphering offical despatches. 
28 The  Grenville letter was received at  the foreign office on 8 Dec.,  at night. There is no 
confirmation that the letter to Taylor ever arrived (or was sent). If so, the presence of Grenville's 
letter in his archive means nothing. I am, however, assuming that the letter to Taylor was sent and 
was received. 
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Talbot's original [sic]'. Second, following on from that fact, she concludes that 
'Grenville had approved' of Talbot's plan.29 Thereafter for a year, the plot, 
'tacitly  accepted with  [Talbot's] appointment'  to Swabia, gestated, without 
Grenville ever referring  to it in correspondence.30  Finally, Sparrow argues, by 
quoting from the letter to Taylor, that Talbot regarded his plan to be 'of great 
consequence'.31 Two  of these statements are wrong; the other, as a conse- 
quence, becomes extremely unlikely. 
Far from the fair copy and the final letter sent to Grenville being identical, 
there are numerous differences between them. Some relate to minor changes 
Talbot must have made while enciphering the message; others are the result of 
Taylor failing to decipher it properly. Talbot admitted that he 'mangled it 
very much in reducing it to cypher',32 with the result that Taylor could not 
make sense of whole sentences and frequently had to guess particular words. In 
one  instance, instead of deciphering the comment  that  the exiled  French 
deputies 'had the highest reputation amongst their colleagues', he came up 
with 'those of the highest repute groan in German colleges'. In another, in the 
crucial paragraph on the use of resolute men who to were to 'make themselves 
masters' of the Directory, he failed to make sense of the statement, crucial to the 
conspiracy, that the action should be carried out without the knowledge of the 
royalists  in the conseils.  No doubt, with some effort the main thrust of Talbot's 
plot could be ascertained, but  the context and the justification for such a 
programme were considerably disfigured in the deciphering process. 
The letter to Grenville appears to demonstrate Talbot's enthusiasm for the 
conspiracy in November I797 and, according to Sparrow, this was confirmed 
by his letter to Taylor. In reality, however, Talbot was trying to play down his 
plan to Taylor. Far from writing that it was of great consequence, he actually 
wrote that 'it was of no  great consequence'.33  Thus, not only is the evidence for 
Grenville understanding the full implications of Talbot's conspiracy weak, but 
there is also strong evidence that at this stage Talbot himself did not take the 
plot very seriously. Talbot appealed to Taylor in November I797  because he 
realized that Grenville might regard him as foolish  for proposing  such a reckless 
scheme and thus not fit to be trusted in sensitive areas of diplomacy. It is 
noteworthy that Talbot may have begun to have second thoughts even while 
enciphering his letter to Grenville: in the fair copy he gave himself the credit for 
devising  the  plan;  in  the  cipher copy  he  attributes the  plan  to  'Count 
Reventlau',  possibly a  code  name  behind which  hid  a  French royalist.34 
Nevertheless, the plot had been planted in Talbot's mind; his havering suggests 
his intellectual vulnerability to proposals of extreme political measures, to 
which subsequently he was to be introduced when he arrived in Swabia. 
29 
Sparrow, 'Swiss and Swabian agencies', p. 870; idem, Secret  service,  p. 149. 
30 Sparrow, 'Swiss and Swabian agencies', p. 876 (my italics). 
31  Ibid., p. 870, footnote.  32  Talbot to Taylor, 24  Nov.  I797,  MS Talbot, c.I2,  fo. 70. 
3 Ibid. (my italics). 
34 Although there were three Count Reventlows at this period (two Danish brothers and a 
cousin), it is highly unlikely that any was involved in counter-revolutionary plotting. 
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completely on her interpretation  of these letters; there is no other corroborating 
evidence. It is clear, however, that these letters cannot be used in the way she 
wishes. The most that can be said is that Talbot sent Grenville the outlines of 
a conspiracy which he himself soon repudiated and that Grenville probably 
read a somewhat garbled version of the plot. There is no evidence to suggest 
that Grenville's silence hid a determination to assist in the assassination  of the 
Directory.  Thus  Sparrow's view  that  there  was  a  year-long  conspiracy, 
officially sanctioned by the British government, cannot be sustained. This, of 
course, has serious  implications bor  a proper understanding  of Talbot's mission 
in Swabia. 
IV 
Talbot returned to England early in January  1798 to find that, despite the 
disasters of the past few months, Grenville was determined to  pursue his 
strategy of winning the war by destroying the French revolutionaries in their 
own backyard, rather than, as Henry Dundas argued, by indirectly throttling 
the French war effort through the seizure  of enemy colonies and the domination 
of world trade.35  For Grenville, the struggle remained an ideological crusade, 
only to be won by the combination of a continental coalition and internal 
subversion, or, as William Windham reported him as saying in October 1797, 
by a French 'civil war, aided by war from without'.36 
Grenville was  strongly supported by  Wickham,  his  trusted adviser on 
European affairs, who  debriefed Talbot  in  London as soon as he  arrived 
home.37  Wickham had his own personal  reasons  for promoting a forward  policy 
in Europe; his wife was Swiss and the safety of her family and Wickham's  many 
friends  in Switzerland  was threatened  by the prospective  French invasion of the 
cantons. But he had also analysed the latest intelligence, sent by Talbot with his 
final despatch of 13 December, and this convinced him that all was not yet lost. 
Reports of the meeting of the proscribed deputies at Neuchatel in November 
1797, when combined with an overall assessment  of the strategic possibilities  of 
Austria's war party gaining influence in Vienna as the threat to Switzerland 
grew, suggested that there might be some value in reviving Wickham's 1797 
policies with regard to the French interior. The reports, written by the former 
deputies Jean FranCois  Vauvilliers and Camille Jordan, exhorted Britain to 
continue its 'active though secret part in French affairs',  by making 'common 
35 For the issues and positions, see A. B. Rodger,  7-he  war of the  Second  Coalition,  i798-i8oi:  a 
strategic  commentary  (Oxford,  i964);  Piers Mackesy, Statesmen  at war: the strategy  of overthrow, 
i798-1799 (London, 1974); Paul W. Schroeder, The transformation  of European  politics, 1763--I848 
(Oxford, 1994);  John Erhman, The  younger  Pitt: the  consuming  struggle  (London, I996). 
36  The Diary  of the  Right  Hon. William  Windham,  I784 to i81o, ed. Mrs Henry Baring (London, 
I866),  p.  379.  For the revolutionary wars as an ideological crusade for Grenville and other 
ministers,  see Emma Vincent Macleod, A war  of ideas: British  attitudes  to the  wars  against  revolutionary 
France,  I792-I802  (Aldershot, 1998), ch. 2. 
37 Wickham to Talbot, n.d. [Wednesday, early Jan.  1798],  MS Talbot, b.22. 
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cause with the Moderate Party [in Paris], and to support that Party with effect 
as before the 4th September', i.e.,  before the coup of Fructidor. They  also 
pointed to two other components of their overall plan:  the possibility of a 
general insurrection  in the southern departments of France if the continuation 
of the war forced the Directory to demand 'extraordinary requisitions'; and 
the preparations  for 'a blow to be struck at Paris', for which, wrote Wickham, 
' the Deputies say they have a plan prepared which they are ready to submit to 
the British Government'.38 
It is possible, indeed likely, that this blow was a reference to the same plan 
Talbot had sent to Grenville in November, although it was now framed within 
a  much  broader and  more  conventional  strategy of  overthrow, with  no 
reference  to the members of the conseils  being kept in the dark. It thus appeared 
to have the character of a coup d'etat or journee  rather than a coup  de main. 
Wickham, however, made no further comment on it in his analysis, which 
suggests  not only that he had no inkling that Grenville had previous knowledge 
of a plot, but also that Talbot had not referred to it in his debriefing. If, as 
Sparrow  claims, Grenville was supporting the plot at this stage, it seems  strange 
that he had not discussed  it earlier with his main foreign policy adviser. Nor is 
there any evidence that the British  government subsequently asked the emigres 
directly for more details, as had been offered in the reports. 
During this era a 'blow' was often used as a loose translation of the French 
phrase coup  de main, which was also frequently to be found untranslated in 
English usage. But did it explicitly refer to assassination? Coup  de main  was 
usually used in a military context, to depict a sudden or surprise  attack or raid. 
For instance,  Sir Arthur Wellesley, the  future duke of Wellington,  when 
recommending the building of five forts  in Ireland in I80 I, wrote that they only 
needed to be 'of 2nd or 3rd class', strong enough 'to resist  any attempt to carry 
them by a coup  de  main'." It could also refer  to the use of large forces,  rather than 
a small group of raiders. Sir Robert Wilson, eagerly following the French 
retreat from Moscow with Russian troops in I812,  said he hoped to 'effect a 
coup-de-main  against a corps of ten thousand Frenchmen'.40  At the time of the 
Walcheren expedition, when the taking of Antwerp by a coup  de  main  was being 
discussed in  parliament,  William  Windham  caused  great  amusement  by 
commenting: 'Good God, Sir, talk of a coup  de main  with forty thousand men 
and thirty-three  sail of the line! Gentlemen might as a well talk of a coup  de  main 
in the Court of Chancery.'41  Even Wickham himself used the phrase in this 
sense. Following  the Austrian army in  Switzerland in  1799, he  informed 
38 Official minute, foreign office, Feb. 1798, Dropmorepapers,  iv, pp. I  1 7-  9. The printed version 
of this paper is misdated. Internal evidence shows that it was drawn up before Talbot returned 
from Switzerland in earlyJanuary. 
39  Quoted  in  Diaries and correspondence  of Charles  Abbot, Lord Colchester,  ed.  Charles, Lord 
Colchester (3 vols., London, I86I), I, p. 277. 
40  Quoted  in  Michael  Glover, A very  slippery  fellow:  the life of Sir Robert  Wilson, 1777-i849 
(London, I978), p.  I20. 
41  The Windham  papers,  ed. Earl of Rosebery (2  vols., London 1913),  I, p. xi. 
555 
This content downloaded  on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 21:27:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMICHAEL  DUREY 
Grenville  that one side of Zurich  was defended  by a fort 'of sufficient  strength 
to protect  the  town  against  a coup-de-main'.42 
Yet  the phrase  could  also be used outside  the context  of military  tactics,  to 
describe  a sudden  and  possibly  violent  political,  or paramilitary,  action.  Sir 
James  Craufurd,  for example,  while  British  minister  at Hamburg  in  1798,  at 
one  point  proposed  'an  act of vigour' against  some  fugitive  Irish  rebels  in  the 
town.  'I  do not mean  to go to the length  of assassination', he added.43 When  a 
few  months  later  he  suggested  the  clandestine  kidnapping  of two  Irish  rebel 
leaders  and  their secret return to Ireland,  he called  it a 'coup  de main'.44  It is 
clear,  therefore,  that contemporary  views  on the meaning  of coup  de main could 
differ and  that  it,  and  its synonym,  a blow,  could  be interpreted  in ways  that 
could  lead  to  misunderstanding.  It  certainly  cannot  be  assumed  that  either 
phrase  always  referred to assassination. 
Despite  acknowledging  that  there  was  little  new  in  the  reports  from  the 
exiled  deputies  and recognizing  that  the primary  issue for British policy  ought 
to  be  support  for  a  besieged  Switzerland,  Wickham  nevertheless  saw  the 
emigres'  plans  as the basis for future  action,  if the necessary  sine qua non, a new 
European  coalition,  could  be forged to renew  the war on the continent.45  After 
further  thought,  he offered  as his 'firm opinion'  the view  that  'this  Party  [the 
Swabian  Agency]  ought  not  to  be  abandoned  but  that  on  the  contrary  we 
ought  to make even large sacrifices to attach  it to us by every possible  tye [sic]'. 
An agent  should  be sent to liaise with  them  as soon as possible,  for the emigres 
had almost run out of funds.46 He had, in fact, already  discussed  this possibility 
with  Talbot.47 
The mission that Grenville  and Wickham  decided  upon had two interlocking 
objectives:  a primary  aim,  secretly  to assist those in Switzerland,  especially  in 
the  canton  of Berne,  who  were  prepared  to resist French  incursions  and  the 
elevation  of  Swiss Jacobins  to  power;  and  a  secondary  aim,  financially  to 
support  the exiled deputies  so that they might strengthen  their clandestine  links 
with  the  French  interior  and  continue  to  act  as  a  conduit  for  political 
intelligence.48  In  some  respects  the  mission  would  be  more  difficult  than 
Wickham's  had  been,  for the  agent  would  have  no  diplomatic  cover  to hide 
behind  and would  need  to live underground.  Certainly,  the agent  would  need 
a  cool  head  and  the  resolution  to  withstand  both  the  wiles  and  the  wilder 
schemes  of the  emigres.  Although  Talbot  by  now  had  many  of the  necessary 
operational  skills  and  some  experience  of  dealing  with  the  deputies,  his 
42 Wickham, Correspondence,  II, p. I  6. 
43 Craufurd to Wickham, 28 Aug. 1798, Wickham papers, Hampshire Record Office (HRO), 
38M49/I/66/4.  44 Craufurd to Grenville, 27 Nov.  1798, PRO FO33/i6,  fo. 192. 
45 Official minute, foreign office, Feb. 1798, Dropmore  papers,  Iv, pp. 1  I7-19. 
46  Wickham to Grenville, 29 Jan.  1798,  PRO  F074/22;  William M[ackintosh] to Talbot, 
3 Jan.  1798, MS Talbot, b.22. 
47 Wickham to Grenville, 29Jan.  1798,  PRO F074/22;  Talbot to d'Andr6, 26Jan.  1798,  MS 
Talbot, b.22, referring  to Wickham as 'chef de notre ancienne maison de commerce'. 
48  Grenville to Talbot,  14 Feb. 1798, MS Talbot, c.15, fos. 12-i7. 
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temperament made him a hazardous choice. There was, however, no obvious 
alternative, except, perhaps,  for Charles  Flint, Talbot's predecessor  as secretary 
to Wickham in  Switzerland, but  he  was needed  to  help Wickham in  his 
counter-espionage duties in the alien office. 
Before he left for Swabia in mid-February, Talbot met Grenville twice to 
discuss the mission. After the first meeting, Talbot drew up a synopsis of the 
conversation, in  which  he  interpreted his orders to  include  assisting in  a 
renewed venture to support royalists in the elections to the French assemblies 
due in May,  who would  then mask their political sympathies until events 
warranted them taking' the reins of government into their own hands'. He also 
understood the  need  'to  keep up  a  good  understanding with  the  refugee 
deputies'.49 Following  the  second  meeting,  Grenville  issued  his  formal 
instructions for Talbot.50 Most of these referred to the Swiss situation, but 
Grenville also gave orders  relating to the French emigres. Only if war broke  out 
between France and Switzerland should Talbot involve himself in measures 
taken by the emigres to undermine the Directory in the southern and eastern 
provinces of France. If, on the other hand, some 'temporary accommodation' 
was made  between France and  Switzerland, 'which  does not  destroy the 
independence and tranquillity of Switzerland', Talbot should confine himself 
to  strengthening lines of communication with  the  French interior and  to 
supporting the royalists' election plans. In other words, Talbot's instructions 
conformed to Wickham's recommendations  in the official  foreign office minute. 
No mention was made of the emigres' proposed blow in Paris. According to 
Sparrow, this was 'a deliberate omission -  no minister would permit a written 
record authorizing assassinations'.51  Undoubtedly,  all sensible ministers or 
officials involved in dangerous plots would seek to keep a healthy distance 
between themselves and the smoking gun, yet even silent approval for such a 
scheme ought to have left some spoor, especially in the Treasury or audit office 
archives, for Talbot could not have supported the plot without access to very 
large amounts of secret service money. Under the 1782 Civil List Act (23 Geo. 
III  c.  82),  although  details on  how  it  was expended  was  not  necessary, 
government officials  had to produce receipts for all secret service money spent 
and had to swear an oath that it had been disbursed  'faithfully according to the 
interest and purpose for which it was given'.52 As David Wilkinson has shown 
when considering the improper spending of home office secret service money in 
Ireland during the Union crisis, the requirement of this oath loomed large in 
the minds of ministers who might be personally liable if funds went astray or 
were proven to be improperly allocated.53 Thus, if Grenville had intended 
Talbot to support the assassination plot, he would certainly have given him 
49 Talbot to Grenville, 5 Feb. 1798 (draft), MS Talbot, c.  5, fo. 7. 
50 Grenville to Talbot,  14 Feb. 1798, MS Talbot, c.15, fos. I2-I7.  51 
Sparrow, 'Swiss and Swabian agencies', pp. 871-2;  Sparrow, Secret  service,  p. I50. 
52  Talbot's oath, dated 20  Feb.  800o,  PRO HDi/I. 
53 David Wilkinson, '"How  did they pass the Union?":  secret service expenditure in Ireland, 
I799-I804',  History, 82  (I997)  pp.  223-51. 
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access to the necessary  funds at the beginning  of his mission.  Some  evidence  of 
this would  necessarily  have remained  in the audit office archives,  among  all the 
other  evidence  of  Talbot's  expenses  during  his  mission.  No  such  evidence, 
however,  can be found.  In reality, Grenville  explicitly  limited  Talbot's  financial 
powers.  Under  Grenville's  instructions,  before  leaving  England  Talbot  sent 
d'Andre  C20,,OO to  keep  the  clandestine  lines  of communication  open  with 
France.54 But thereafter he was limited  to spending  a further  I  o,ooo  and, even 
then, he was told to draw it only 'under  circumstances  of unforeseen  exigency'. 
You will not, reiterated  Grenville,  'make  use of this permission  unless in case of 
real necessity'.55 As Mitchell  has rightly pointed  out, compared  with Wickham, 
Talbot  was forced  to work on a shoestring.56 There  was no way  he could  have 
financed  an assassination  plot  with  the money  at his disposal. 
V 
Talbot  arrived in Ulm  on 2 March  1798 with his younger  brother Robert,  who 
was  to  be  his  secretary,  cipher  clerk,  and  messenger,  on  a  mission  that  was 
probably  unprecedented.  Like Wickham  in  I794,  he had set off from England 
with instructions  unknown  to anyone  in the foreign office, except  Grenville  and 
Canning,  but, unlike Wickham,  he and his brother  were to live under  assumed 
names -James  and  Robert  Tindal  -  and  had  no  official  character  (his cover 
story, for home and, if necessary,  foreign consumption,  was that he was en route 
to  St  Petersburg  as secretary  of legation).57  As Talbot  recognized,  he  was  a 
'secret  agent',58  but  he  also  had  the  responsibilities  of  a  diplomat  and 
commissary,  even  if  the  Swiss  with  whom  he  was  to  liaise  were  now  an 
opposition  resistance.  His role, decidedly  ambiguous  from the outset,  was to be 
decided  by  events.  If  war  broke  out  between  the  Swiss  Confederation  and 
France,  he was  to do  all in his power  to assist the  Swiss,  including  fomenting 
counter-revolution  in the  French  interior;  if some  'accommodation'  between 
the  Swiss and  the French  were  achieved,  he was to confine  himself  to gaining 
intelligence  from  France.  Unfortunately,  his instructions  were  out  of date  by 
the  time  he  reached  Swabia  and  gave  him  little  assistance  to  deal  with  the 
situation  confronting  him:  the  cantons  revolutionized  from  within;  a French 
army welcomed  into the lowland  regions of Switzerland  by the SwissJacobins; 
and no official declaration  of war. Within  days of arrival Talbot  was reporting 
the capitulation  of Berne, the canton  from which  both Grenville  and Wickham 
had  expected  the strongest  resistance  to the revolutionary  contagion.59 
54 Talbot  to Grenville, 6  Feb.  1797 [I798],  PRO  F074/22;  receipt, dated  I2  Feb.  1798, 
attached to audit office queries [ 801], PRO HDi/i. 
55 Grenville to Talbot,  14 Feb. 1798, MS Talbot, c.  5, fo. 17. 
56 Mitchell, Underground  war,  p. 221. 
57 Grenville to George III, 8 Feb. 1798, in The  later  correspondence  of George  III, ed. A. Aspinall (5 
vols., Cambridge, 1967), II,  p.  i8;  Grenville to Sir Charles Whitworth, 20  Feb. 1798, Dropmore 
papers, Iv, pp. 95--6.  58 Talbot to Grenville, 5 Feb. 1798,  MS Talbot, c. I5,  fo. 8. 
59 Talbot  to Canning,  no.  2,  I0  Mar.  1798,  PRO  74/22  (draft  in MS  Talbot,  c.I5,  fos.  22-6). 
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No better news came from his first  meeting with the leaders of Louis XVIII's 
newly created Swabian agency.60 They  reported that, following the law of 
I2 pluvi6se An VI  (3I January 1798), which gave the outgoing legislature in 
Paris the power to decide on the validity of the election of incoming deputies, 
Talbot's aim to influence the May elections would have no chance of success.61 
Within  a  week  of  arriving in  Swabia,  therefore, all  that  unquestionably 
remained ofTalbot's instructions  was the order to garner intelligence from the 
French interior, a process that was already in place and being funded from the 
?20,000  that Talbot had sent to d'Andre. Talbot was faced with the prospect 
of becoming no more than a letter box, receiving and passing on to London the 
news from France. 
This was hardly the dashing role Talbot had hoped to play. It is perhaps not 
surprising, therefore, that he was open to suggestions from the pur royalists, 
anxious to inveigle Talbot into their desperate and violent schemes. Their first 
step was to convince Talbot that, despite the weakness of the royalists in the 
interior, it would be possible secretly to support the Jacobins in the elections 
and  thereafter take advantage  of any  convulsions that  might ensue. This 
royalisme  a bonnet  rouge,  as Directory propaganda neatly termed it,62 was not 
quite  such  an  absurd and  impractical  strategy  as  some  historians have 
suggested (a comparison might be made, for instance, with the strategy of the 
communist resistance  in occupied France during the Second World War, when 
they  hoped  to  take advantage  of  the disruption caused by  the  resistance 
activities of Gaullist and allied-supported reseaux).63  Tentative  overtures to 
royalists, suggesting an alliance against the common enemy, were in fact made 
in Paris, but they were more the result of frustration amongst a tiny group of 
Jacobin  intellectuals, who  had  seen  their electoral efforts stymied by  the 
Directory's determination  to  protect  their position  by  once  again  riding 
roughshod over the constitution of the Year III,  than evidence of a genuine 
Jacobin desire for unity of action.64 
Despite initial reservations, however, Talbot  was soon caught up in  the 
Swabian agency's machinations. In his initial despatches to London he tended 
to take a neutral line, reporting without comment the hopes and aspirations  of 
60 The leaders were Antoine-Balthazar, baron d'Andre (Wickham's  confidant), Louis-Francois 
Perrin de Precy (whom Grenville trusted  for his caution),Joseph-Luc-Jean, president  de Vezet (an 
antediluvian royalist, titular head of the agency),  and the abbe Jean-Francois Andr6, aka La 
Marre.  La Marre  was in England when Talbot met the others together for the first  time at the abbey 
of Salmansweiler. Marquis Dugon, Au service  du roi  en exil (Paris, i968),  p. 174. 
61 Talbot to Canning, no. 3 draft, 13 Mar. 1798, MS Talbot, c.I5,  fo. 28. 
62 Isser Woloch, Jacobin legacy: the democratic  movement  under  the Directory  (Princeton,  I970), 
Pp.  277-8. 
63  Mitchell, Underground  war,  p. 223;  Sparrow, Secret  service,  pp. 159-60.  As late asJune 1803 the 
possibility of a Jacobin-royalist alliance was being discussed  in British political circles, from which 
'a revolution might be operated'. Malmesbury told Lord Pelham that this had been a possibility 
from August 1797. Malmesbury, Diaries, Io June  1803, iv, p. 265. 
64  Talbot to Canning, 14 June  I798, MS Talbot, c.15,  fo. io6;  D. M. G. Sutherland, France, 
I789-i815: revolution  and  counterrevolution  (London, i985),  pp. 309-i0. 
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the royalists.  He also declared  his determination  to keep the Swabian  agency's 
leaders at arms length,  dampening  their hopes of receiving  financial  backing.65 
Within  six weeks,  however,  he was expressing  'the  most perfect approbation  of 
the  conduct  of  these  gentlemen.  I  find  them  extremely  reasonable  in  every 
respect.'66  Talbot  was  hooked,  a victim  of that  which  Talleyrand  called  the 
supreme  vice of diplomacy:  an excess of zeal.  In the draft of his ninth despatch, 
dated  3 May,  he wrote,  for enciphering,  that  'Some  of the proscribed  French 
Deputies  have  conceived  the  project  of striking  a blow  in  Paris by  a body  of 
resolute  men'.  En clair, he continued, 
They have communicated it to me and although I foresaw the greatest difficulty of the 
execution of it in the present state of things, I did not judge it expedient to refuse them 
pecuniary assistance, under the idea  that  every shock of whatever nature soever, 
although it may not immediately produce the desired effect, serves to convince the 
nation, while it offers even a possibility of success, of the instability of the present order 
of things.67 
A fortnight  later  Talbot  informed  London,  again  in cipher,  that  he  had  sent 
o,oo000  to Paris,  to be  'ready  in case  of any  hidden  and  important  demand 
which  the present  state  of things  may  give  birth  to'.68 
Three  points  need  to  be  made  about  the  formulation  of  these  particular 
despatches.  First,  while  drafting  despatch  no.  9  Talbot  certainly  had  an 
assassination  plot  in  mind,  the  one  which,  as  Sparrow  has  shown,  d'Andre 
reported  to Louis XVIII's  council  in Mittau  later in the month  and which  was 
separate  from,  if ultimately  linked  to,  the  broader  intrigues  of  le travail, the 
royalist  agency  in  Paris.69 Second,  the  deciphering  process  again  intervened 
between  what  Talbot  wrote  and  what  Grenville  was  able  to  read.  Whereas 
Talbot's  draft of despatch  no. 9 refers, as above,  to ' a body of resolute men',  the 
version as deciphered  at the foreign office omits that crucial phrase.70 Whatever 
the reason for this -  whether  Talbot  or his brother deliberately  left out this part 
of the  message,  or whether  it was poorly  deciphered  -  the effect  was  to allow 
multiple  or alternative  readings  of the  report,  deflecting  attention  away  from 
'the  blow'  as a specific  assassination  plot  towards  the likelihood  of it referring 
to part of a more  general journee or insurrection.  That  Talbot  may  have  done 
this deliberately,  in order to keep Grenville  in ignorance,  remains  speculative, 
but he must have  known  that his decision  to finance  the plot was questionable, 
given  the fact that his instructions  allowed  him to use the  I  o,ooo  only  'under 
65 Talbot to Canning, 13, 30 Mar. 1798, MS Talbot, c. 15, fos. 28-9, 58. Louis's agents thought 
Talbot, at this point, was 'timid and unwilling to act'. Dugon, Au service  du  roi en  exil, p. 193. 
66 Talbot to Canning, 21 Apr. 1798, MS Talbot, c. 15, fo. 72. 
67  Tindal  to Canning (draft), 3 May 1798, MS Talbot, c.I5, fo. 79. 
68 Talbot to Canning, I6 May 1798, MS Talbot, c.I5, fo. 88. 
69 Sparrow, Secret  service,  p. I55. 
70  Tindal  to Canning, 3 May 1798, PRO F074/22.  As Sparrow, in her book, gives the wrong 
footnote reference, it is unclear whether she is aware that the draft and the final version of this 
despatch are different. 
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circumstances  of unforeseen  exigency'.71  How  he proceeded  would  depend  on 
the  response  he received  from London. 
Despatch  no.  9 reached  the foreign  office on 22 May;  Grenville  replied  to it 
and the previous  despatches  two days later  (he thus did not know  at this point 
that  the  1io,ooo had  been  sent  to Paris,  the next  despatch  with  this news not 
arriving  until  9 June).  In the circumstances,  it would  be fair to say that  those 
parts of the despatches  referring to the internal  affairs of France were not given 
the  highest  priority  in  London.  Although  Wickham,  in  his  secret  service 
capacity,  still  offered  an  experienced  guiding  hand  in  foreign  affairs,  his 
energies  were  being  mainly  expended  on  his duties  as undersecretary  at  the 
home  office,  with  responsibility  for counter-espionage  in  Ireland,  where  the 
rebellion  had  just  broken  out,  and  in  England  and  Scotland.  Moreover, 
Grenville  had  just  begun  to  receive  intelligence  from  another  major  source 
within  France,  a network  established  by  Sir Sidney  Smith  before  he  escaped 
from France.72 This avenue  promised  more up-to-date  intelligence  from better- 
placed  sources than Talbot's,  as the lines of communication  went  directly  from 
Paris to London.  Indeed,  as the exiled  deputies  soon came  to realize,  this new 
network  would  marginalize  Talbot's  enterprise  in  the  eyes  of  the  foreign 
office.73 Finally,  it was Talbot's  activities  relating  to crisis-torn Switzerland  -  in 
particular,  his  promise  to  aid  the  smaller  Swiss  cantons  if  they  rose  in 
insurrection  -  rather  than  his  vague  French  news  that  caught  Grenville's 
attention  when  reading  the despatches.  Grenville's  response  (despatch  no. 4), 
in which  he invoked  the king's  name,  was  crushing:  it was  'highly  improper' 
of Talbot  to promise financial  help, for it would  only lead to 'useless slaughter'. 
Talbot  was  ordered  to stay  on  the frontier,  to get  intelligence  on  the internal 
situation  in Switzerland.  No  specific  mention,  however,  was made  of Talbot's 
French  plans.74 At  this  point,  therefore,  Grenville  and  Talbot  were  moving 
along  different  lines,  the  former  totally  focused  on  Switzerland,  the 
latter -  under  the influence  of the agency  -  giving  as much  priority  to France 
as to Switzerland. 
A  further  complication  was  the  apparent  failure  of  Grenville's  fourth 
despatch  to reach  Talbot  directly.  On  13 July  Grenville  sent  Talbot  another 
copy,  with  the  terse  statement,  'I  have  at  present  nothing  to  add  ...  [and] 
desire  that  you  will  conform  yourself  to  the  instructions  [relating  to 
Switzerland]  contained  in [no. 4].  75  Thus  two months  elapsed  between  Talbot 
71 See above, p. 558. 
72  Durey, 'Escape of Sir Sidney Smith', pp. 456-7.  The first reports were received in May. 
7Talbot to Canning, 30 July 1798, MS Talbot, c. 15, fos. 137-8; Dugon, Au  service  du  roi  en  exil, 
pp. 186, I93-4. 
74 Grenville to Talbot, 24  May  1798,  PRO F074/22  (MS Talbot, c.15,  fo. 93). 
75 Grenville to Talbot,  13 July  i798,  PRO  F074/22.  Only one copy of this despatch is in 
Talbot's papers. Talbot acknowledged 'a degree of dissatisfaction' by Grenville with his conduct, 
after his brother Robert returned from his first trip to London in mid-September. Wickham seems 
to have warned Robert of Grenville's  displeasure.  Talbot to Grenville, private, Talbot to Canning, 
28 Sept. 1798, MS Talbot, c. 15, fos. 173, 175. 
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writing  despatch  no.  9 and  his receiving  a response,  a long  hiatus  during  the 
summer  months,  when  the  mail  travelled  relatively  quickly.  By  the  time 
Grenville's  despatch  arrived Talbot  had again  seemingly  reverted  to the wider 
strategy,  reporting  to  London  royalist  plans  that  involved  them  remaining 
'upon  the watch'  in order 'to  concentrate  their means  in such a manner  as to 
enable  them to avail  themselves  of any commotion  [stirred up by the Jacobins] 
which  may  take place.  They  are advised  to continue  at present  quiet.'  To  be 
sure,  Talbot  mentioned  a  coup de main, but  once  more  it  referred  to  a  blow 
within  a larger  conspiracy,  triggered  in  this case  by  the Jacobins.76  Talbot's 
own  expressed  concerns  about  the practicality  of this strategy  involving  both 
extreme  groups  must  have  left  Grenville,  who  viewed  Talbot's  mission  as 
purely  an  intelligence-gathering  operation,  with  the  impression  that  it 
remained  merely  a speculative  idea  with  few  possible  consequences.77  More 
important,  the  separate  plan  to  assassinate  the  Directory  remained  masked 
behind  a wider  conspiracy  that  conformed  to  elements  of Wickham's  grand 
plan of  795-7,  namely  the co-ordination  of widespread  internal  insurrections 
with  an invasion  by Austria. 
Nevertheless,  the fact  remains  that  in  the  few despatches  Grenville  sent  to 
Talbot  -  he sent  only  six in  1798,  compared  with  the  thirty-four  he  received 
from Talbot  -  he did not explicitly  order Talbot  to refrain from involvement  in 
the various  plots  put  up by the royalists  within  France.  From  his perspective, 
Grenville  probably  did not feel the need to do more than briefly remind Talbot 
of his original  instructions,  which  he did,  twice,  and with some asperity.78 After 
all,  there was no expectation  in  I798  that  Austria  would  resume  the war  and 
therefore no immediate  opportunity  to resurrect the grand plan. From Talbot's 
perspective,  however,  the absence  of a specific  response from the foreign  office 
could  be  interpreted  as  silent  acquiescence  in  his  schemes,  which  were  not 
premised  on  Austrian  intervention  but  assumed  success  to  be  achievable  by 
internal  convulsions  alone.79 
Of  most  importance  would  have  been  London's  failure  to  comment  on 
Talbot's  decision  to send  the  ,Io,ooo  to  Paris.  Why  the  significance  of  this 
action  was not picked  up can only  be surmised.  Perhaps  Grenville  assumed  the 
money  was being  spent  only  on intelligence-gathering,  which  was the original 
intention,  or perhaps  he was confused  by Talbot's  various  requests for money, 
for  the  despatches  usually  never  made  clear  whether  Talbot  was  seeking  to 
finance  operations  in Switzerland  or in France.  Sparrow's  own  interpretation 
76 Talbot to Canning, 12  July  1798 (received 3 Aug.), PRO F074/22. 
77  Talbot to Canning, 31 Aug. 1798, MS Talbot, c.15,  fo. 153. 
78  Wickham reiterated this point in a private letter to Talbot, dated 13 Sept. 1798: 'Remember 
only and I cannot repeat it too often, that Intelligence  will be prized here far beyond everything else 
that you can send.' MS Talbot, c.15, fo. I62. 
79 Talbot to Canning, 28 Sept. 1798, MS Talbot, c. 15, fos. 177-8; Talbot to Grenville, private, 
19 Feb. I799, MS Talbot, b.27, fo. 38. One half of this first  despatch, in which Talbot pointed out 
that he had received no comment on his French plans, was indecipherable. Canning to Talbot, 
23 Oct.  1798, MS Talbot, c.I5, fo. 190. 
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suggests that this sort of confusion was possible at the foreign office. She has 
claimed that Talbot's request  in lateJuly for bills of exchange or access to credit 
facilities, as the 'crisis may occur soon', related only to Paris, and that Grenville 
agreed to supply the money with that destination in mind, yet Talbot's appeal 
was decidedly ambiguous, coming in the context of his assertion  that he had lost 
no  opportunity of  forwarding Britain's policy  both  in  France  (not  Paris 
specifically) and  in  Switzerland. The  money  that  he  reported as  having 
deposited in Lyon, 'in case of any important demand', could  just as easily have 
been transferred  across the frontier to Switzerland as back to Paris.80 
Responsibility for these misunderstandings  as late as August and September 
must lie partly with Grenville. In extenuation, he was distracted by events in 
Hamburg, which had suddenly become a hotbed of intrigue and espionage, 
filled with exiled Irish rebels.81  He was also in  the process of breaking off 
negotiations for an alliance with Austria and thus the grand plan of an Austrian 
invasion of France in conjunction with widespread insurrections  in the French 
interior -  which remained, in London's eyes, the framework  of the French part 
of Talbot's mission -  was not in the forefront  of his mind.82 
Canning too, perhaps, must share some of the blame. In-coming despatches 
arrived first on his desk; he was responsible  for deciphering and for preparing 
the official post for Grenville. It was a laborious and frustratingjob, with surges 
of great activity following the simultaneous arrival of bulky and multiple 
despatches from various European countries, held up at Cuxhaven by bad 
weather.83  Although cordial, his relations with Grenville-  a notoriously cold 
and  straitlaced  character-  had  deteriorated  during  the  Lille  peace 
negotiations in 1797 and thereafter his enthusiasm for his role in the foreign 
office waned.84 In October  1798 he informed Pitt that he was tired of his 
position and asked to be relieved.85  On resigning in March 1799, Canning 
happily informed his cousin that he would go 'frisking and flourishing about, 
so happy in my new liberty, after three years of such slavery as never was 
slaved'.86  With his mind not fully on the job -  he established the Anti-Jacobin 
magazine during this period -  it is perhaps not surprising that evidence of 
sloppy and unprofessional  work practices  in the foreign office exists: despatches 
were not fully digested; translations were slow; and even secret messages, 
written in lemon juice on the covers of letters, were destroyed without being 
read.87 
80  Sparrow, Secret  service,  p. i66; Talbot to Canning, 30July  I798,  MS Talbot, c. 15, fos. 136-7. 
81  Paul Weber, On  the  road  to  rebellion:  the  United  Irishmen  and  Hamburg,  I796-i803 (Dublin, 1997).  82 Karl A. Roider,  Jr, Baron  Thugat  and  Austria's  response  to  the  French  Revolution  (Princeton, 1987), 
p. 288.  83  Sir Charles Petrie, George  Canning  (London, I946), p. 37. 
84 Wendy Hinde, George  Canning  (London, 1973), pp. 56-7. 
85 Peter Dixon, George  Canning  politician  and  statesman  (New York, 1976), pp. 38-9. 
86 Quoted in Petrie, Canning,  p. 48. 
87 
Canning to Talbot, 22 Mar. 1799, MS Talbot, b.27, fo. 73. 
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VI 
On  I6  December  i798  Robert  Talbot,  sore  and  weary  after  a  stormy  sea 
passage  of  seven  days  and  six  nights  between  Cuxhaven  and  Yarmouth,88 
arrived at the foreign  office, carrying  a bulky despatch  and  two private  letters 
from his brother.  He could  not have  caused  more consternation  if he had been 
carrying  an infernal machine,  for the despatch  contained  a long  account  of the 
progress  of  the  assassination  plot  in  Paris  and  James  Talbot's  part  in  its 
preparation.  From  an historiographical  point  of view,  despatch  no.  31 is very 
instructive,  for if, as Sparrow maintains,  a conspiratorial  plot between  Grenville 
and  Talbot  had  been  hatched  nearly  a year  earlier,  why  did  Talbot  write  en 
clair about  it at length  in an official  despatch,  which  Grenville  would  have  to 
show  to  the  king  and  even,  perhaps,  to  other  cabinet  ministers  and  privy 
councillors?  Furthermore,  why, in an accompanying  private letter to Grenville, 
did  Talbot  'beg  a  thousand  pardons  for  the  trouble  I  now  give  your 
Lordship'?89  The  short  answer  is that  in November,  after having  committed 
himself  and,  more  importantly,  having  raised  a great  deal  of money  without 
Grenville's  knowledge  or  assent,  to  support  a  cause  that  appealed  to  his 
adventurous  streak,  he  had  suddenly  had  second  thoughts,  possibly  because 
Precy, whom  Grenville  trusted for his caution  and commonsense,  was hostile  to 
the  plan.90  Moreover,  Talbot  realized  that,  having  borrowed  large  un- 
sanctioned  sums on behalf  of the government,  he needed  to justify  them  to his 
master  and  explain  why  he had  gone  beyond  his instructions.  The  strategy  of 
openly  describing  the royalists' plot in an official despatch,  yet at the same time 
placing  it within  a precisely  defined  context,  would  at least force Grenville  to 
make  a clear and definite  response,  something  which  had  been  lacking  during 
the previous  months.  Rather  than this despatch  confirming  that Grenville  had 
supported  the plot  throughout  1798, it shows  that  Talbot  did  not  know  what 
Grenville's  views  were,  but  desperately  wanted  to find out. 
The  catalyst  for Talbot's  decision  to enlighten  Grenville  was his interview  in 
Augsburg,  a few days before he wrote despatch  no. 3 I, with Pierre-Paul  Royer- 
Collard,  d'Andre's  principal  Parisian  agent  and  one  of the  four  conspirators 
who  were  expected  to  take  control  in  Paris if the  plot  were  successful.91 The 
smooth-talking  Royer-Collard,  whose  intelligence  reports from Paris had  'less 
enthusiasm  and  more just  reasoning  than  any  other  from  the  same  quarter', 
convinced  Talbot  that  'the  public  opinion  has  been  at  no  period  since  the 
commencement  of the Revolution  so decidedly  pronounced  as at this moment'. 
The  popularity  of republicanism  was in precipitate  decline;  'the  general  wish 
is to be simply  the restoration  of the ancient  monarchy'.  With  the Directory  in 
disarray;  state finances  in a ruinous state;  recruitment  to the army unpopular; 
88  7ames  Tindal  to Sir Arthur Paget, 21 Jan.  1799, BL, Add. MS 48394, fo. 93. 
89  Talbot to Grenville, 26 Nov.  1798, PRO F074/22. 
90 Talbot to Canning, 9 Dec. 1798, MS Talbot, c. 15, fo. 219; Grenville to Talbot, 15 Mar. 1799, 
MS Talbot, b.27, fo. 59.  91  Sparrow, Secret  service,  p. I74. 
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the  Parisian sections and  most departments prepared to  rise; and several 
generals and 200-300  officers in Paris to be counted on, the royalists were 
confident that 'they shall find sufficient support  in case they should succeed in 
overthrowing the Directory'. The spark to set this insurrection  off would be an 
attack on the Directors themselves by a group of men who were available from 
various departments in the country. 'They  only wait for orders to repair to 
their destination.'92 
Of the plot itself, Talbot boldly informed Grenville: 
The mode proposed for its execution whenever matters shall be sufficiently  mature is to 
assemble in  the vicinity of the metropolis but so dispersed as not  to occasion any 
suspicion of their intention, the body of men destined for the coup de main. They are not 
to be suffered  to enter Paris  for fear of accidents more than four and twenty hours before 
the time appointed for employing them. Should they succeed in making away with the 
Directory it is then the intention to have the tocsin sounded to assemble the sections, 
declare the King and despatch couriers  immediately into all departments; to abolish the 
councils without delay and vest the government in a commission of four persons who 
shall exercise it in the name of the King until the arrival of His Majesty. 
So convincing  was Royer-Collard,  continued  Talbot, 
that I am almost tempted to flatter myself that it may be attended with success. I have 
consequently in conformity with the language I  have all along held, viz.  that His 
Majesty would not be backward  in granting the funds necessary  to put in execution any 
undertaking  which offered a reasonable chance of restoring  order to that long distracted 
country, pledged myself to furnish the full of the demand made by this gentleman.93 
The  cost,  estimated  Talbot,  would  be  about  'a  million  of  French  livres' 
(approximately  /40,o00). 
There  was enough  truth in this analysis of the situation  in France  to hide the 
big lie at its centre:  despite  the directory's  unpopularity  and widespread  unrest, 
public  opinion  did not favour  the pur royalists and a return to the ancien  regime. 
Talbot's  desperate  aim,  however,  was  to  convince  Grenville  that  the  plan 
conformed  closely  to the grand  plan  of 1795-7  and  that,  therefore,  he had  not 
gone  beyond  his instructions.  This  required  ignoring  the  sine qua non of both 
Wickham's  plan  and  Talbot's  instructions,  war  between  Austria  and  France, 
and justifying  the assassination  plot  as a substitute  for the role of the moderate 
party  in  the  councils,  which,  claimed  Talbot,  'had  so  vilified  itself  in  the 
publick  opinion  by  its pusillanimity  ...  that  it  has  long  lost  every  shadow  of 
influence  '.94 
Grenville,  understandably,  was  not  impressed.  As  Sparrow  rightly  points 
out, he would  have  been personally  liable  for the debt incurred  in France  once 
the  Treasury  realized  that  Talbot  had  gone  beyond  his  instructions.95 
Fortunately,  however,  although  the money  had been placed in various accounts 
in France,  it had  not  yet  been  drawn  upon.  Nor  was there much  likelihood  of 
92  Talbot  to Grenville,  25  Nov.  1798,  MS Talbot,  c.15,  fos.  205-8. 
93 Ibid.,  fos.  208-10.  94 Ibid.,  fo.  202.  95 Sparrow,  Secret  service, p. i69. 
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it  being  used  in  the  immediate  future,  for  Royer-Collard  thought  that  the 
royalists  needed  'a strong  motive', such  as the outbreak  of war or 'any  measure 
of sufficient violence'  by the Directory  'to give an additional  spur to the public 
imagination'.  It might  be  the spring  of  I799  before  the  explosion  occurred.96 
This  gave  Grenville  some  leeway,  a lucky  circumstance,  for, with  the weather 
in the North  Sea so severe  that  Cuxhaven  remained  ice-bound  for the second 
half of December  and  the whole  ofJanuary,  there was no opportunity  to send 
an  immediate  message  to  Talbot.97  It  was  thus  not  until  25 January  that 
Grenville  prepared  his  response,  which,  although  exonerating  Talbot  from 
anything  other  than  an  excess  of zeal  'for  the  advantage  of your  country', 
nevertheless  ordered  him  'to  lose no time in entirely  and distinctly  putting  an 
end  to the negotiation  in question'.98 
VII 
Assassinations,  or  at  least,  threats  of  assassinations,  were  not  uncommon  in 
these years;  they were usually  the response of disappointed  and desperate  men 
of extreme  political  persuasions,  both  from the left and  the right.  In England, 
Wickham  was  reported  to  be  the  potential  victim  of displaced  Frenchmen, 
angry at the prospect of being deported  under the provisions of the Aliens Act.99 
United  Irishmen  in  London  targeted  both  William  Pitt  and  George  III.100 
Disaffected  patriots sought  to assassinate  Frenchmen  in Switzerland.0lo  Talbot 
and his royalist cronies fitted  this pattern,  except  that they supposedly  had  the 
weight  and  influence  of the British  foreign  secretary  behind  them.  Grenville, 
however,  makes an incongruous  accessory  to assassination.  Although  no one in 
the  British  cabinet  was  more  ideologically  committed  to  the  downfall  of 
revolutionary  France  and  only  William  Windham  more  ruthless  in pursuit  of 
a strategy  to embroil  the French  in a destructive  civil war,  Grenville  drew  the 
line  at  the  prospect  of deliberately  targeting  the  legitimate  rulers of France, 
with whom  twice he had been involved  in peace  negotiations  in recent years.102 
If his response  to Talbot  -  the plot was 'wholly  abhorrent  from the sentiments 
of Honour  and humanity  which  ...  become  the character  of a civilized  Nation, 
96  Talbot to Canning, 25  Nov.  1798, MS Talbot, c. I5,  fos. 2  IO-I . 
97 Dropmore  papers,  iv, p. xxxii. Grenville's brother, on mission to Prussia, was forced back to 
Yarmouth in December. On his second voyage in February he was shipwrecked off the German 
coast. 
98  Grenville to Talbot, 25 Jan.  I799, PRO F074/23.  Sparrow, 'Swiss and Swabian agencies', 
p. 879, argues that Grenville only brought the plot to an end after the arrest in Dover of Lord 
Camelford, his close kinsman, earlier in January, while he was in the process of finding a boat for 
France, possibly in order to assassinate the Director, Barras. Although Grenville was acutely 
embarrassed  by this episode, it did not cause him to abandon a plot in which he had had no part. 
For Camelford's  expedition, see Nikolai Tolstoy, The  half-mad  lord: Thomas  Pitt,  2nd  Baron  Camelfbrd, 
(1775-80o4) (London, 1978). 
99 James Craufurd to Wickham, 14 Sept. 1798, HRO 38M49/I/66/7. 
100 Wickham to Edward Cooke, 23 Mar. 1799, Wickham to Lord Castlereagh, 26 Mar. 1799, 
PRO HO  Ioo/86,  fos. 179, I98-9.  101 Sparrow, Secret  service,  p. I61. 
102 For Windham, see The Windham  papers,  n, p.  2 and passim. 
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and  are necessary for the preservation of the Laws and rights of civilized 
War'03 -  is viewed merely as evidence of his duplicity, as Sparrow  suggests,  his 
reply to Sir James Craufurd, when he proposed kidnapping the rebel Irish 
leaderJames Napper Tandy in Hamburg at this time, cannot be ignored: 'I 
can by no means think it right that any of the King's Ministers should engage 
in Plans of this nature which generally end in the Death of the Persons  intended 
to be seized.'l04 
Rather than the foreign office being surreptitiously  involved in a long-term 
violent conspiracy in  1798, Britain's secret and undercover policy towards 
France remained substantially unchanged between 1795 and I8oo. What was 
new in 1798 was the rogue strategy undertaken  by Talbot, which Grenville and 
Canning did not comprehend until Talbot finally came clean in December. As 
Wickham explained to Gen. Pichegru in May  1799, 'the dissolution of the 
Swabian agency was only  caused by intrigues which it  was impossible to 
unravel from here [London]'.l05 
Talbot,  on the other hand, was to claim in mitigation that the plan he 
undertook to  finance 'differed in  few particulars except in  its immediate 
consequences  from what was meditated before 4 September 1797  '.106  Whether 
he truly believed this remains moot, for in reality there were very substantial 
differences between Wickham's grand plan and Talbot's. In particular, the 
abandonment of the moderates  in the conseils  and their replacement in the plan 
by a group of assassins  not only altered the character of the proposed explosion 
in Paris, changing it from a 'legal' political coup to a potential bloodbath, but 
also left the constitutional monarchists and other moderates out in the cold. 
Wickham's plan involved incorporating all political elements in opposition to 
the Directory; Talbot's excluded all but the extreme left and the extreme right. 
This greatly increased the risk  of a successful  insurrection  ultimately falling into 
the hands of the Jacobins. 
Moreover, Britain's underground strategy within revolutionary France was 
always premised on a conjunction with external war and the prospect of an 
Austrian, or coalition, invasion of French territory. Although Talbot subse- 
quently claimed that he was preparing  for the moment when there would be 'a 
speedy renewal of hostilities', in reality he had acknowledged earlier that 'this 
project  does  not  seem  to  depend  solely  upon  the  recommencement  of 
hostilities'.1"0  Throughout his mission Talbot  had consistently argued that 
'any shock in the interior of France ultimately tends to produce a favourable 
change'.108 
In the event, there were few immediate untoward consequences from this 
episode. Sir Sidney Smith's 'Julie Caron' network continued to send regular 
103  Grenville  to Talbot,  25 Jan.  1799,  PRO  F074/23. 
104  Grenville to Craufurd, I Dec.  1798, PRO FO33/I6,  fo. 217.  105 Wickham to Major  Perou  [Pichegru], 2I  May 1799, Wickham, Correspondence,  I,  p.  IOI. 
106  Talbot to Grenville, private, 19 Feb. 1799, MS Talbot, b.27, fo. 38.  107  Ibid.;  Talbot  to Canning, 25  Nov.  1798,  MS Talbot,  c.  5, fo. 21  . 
108  Talbot to Grenville, private and confidential, 25 Aug.  1799,  MS Talbot, b.27, fo. 109. 
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and useful intelligence  from Paris during  the period  of the second  coalition.109 
The  Swabian  agents,  after  their  bellows  of indignation  had  died  down,  were 
soon  again  offering  assistance  to Wickham  when  he returned  to the continent 
inJuly  1799. But the concept  of assassination  as a viable  political  tool had taken 
root  among  the  pur  royalists  and  was  to  be  resurrected,  with  disastrous 
consequences,  when  the  war  was  renewed  in  I803  and  a  more  malleable 
minister,  Lord Hawkesbury,  was sitting in the foreign office. It was the product 
of a raging despair among  the extreme  royalists and of the success of Bonaparte's 
policy  of inveigling  emigres  back  to France  during  the period  of peace. 
Remarkably,  there  was  no  financial  loss  to  the  government  as  a  result  of 
Talbot's  adventures.  All the money  that he had illegally  raised and transferred 
to France was eventually  returned.  It was subsequently  discovered  that a profit 
had  been  made  from accrued  interest  and  fluctuations  in  the exchange  rate, 
which  suggests  that  Talbot's  continued  confidence  in  the  royalists'  rectitude 
was not totally  naive.11" Grenville,  aware that the reputations  of his family  and 
the foreign  office were at stake,  and no doubt  feeling  pangs  of guilt  for having 
left his kinsman  alone,  unsupported  and prey to the wiles and rivalries of the pur 
royalists in a hostile  environment,  soon transferred Talbot  to Sweden,  initially 
as secretary  of legation  but  subsequently  as envoy  extraordinary.1l 
Talbot,  for his part,  twice  wrote  privately  to  Grenville  after  notice  of his 
recall,  once  from  Augsburg  (in  lemon  juice)  and  once  after  returning  to 
England,  in an attempt  to explain  his actions."12 Although  he could  easily have 
done so, in neither did he defend himself by referring to secret instructions  given 
to  him  by  Grenville  or  Wickham,  either  before  he  left  for  Swabia  or 
subsequently.  Indeed,  if there  had  been  a conspiracy  between  Grenville  and 
Talbot,  there would  have  been  no reason  to have  written  at all. 
In  I803,  before the war with  France  recommenced,  Talbot  was working  for 
Sir Charles Whitworth  at the embassy  in Paris. Shortly  after his arrival he was 
visited  by  an  Irishman  called  Turner,  who  claimed  to  have  been  a  spy  for 
Wickham  in Hamburg  and was again  seeking  employment.  Talbot  refused to 
have  anything  to do with  him.  'It  is of the  utmost  importance',  he informed 
Wickham  rather  pompously,  'that  HM  Mission  should  not  ever  be suspected 
of dabbling  in any intrigues  whatsoever'.11'  Perhaps  Talbot,  too, had learnt  a 
lesson from his mission to Swabia,  even  though  it meant  leaving  out in the cold 
Samuel  Turner,  one of Britain's  most  effective  spies in this era, and  rendering 
Britain  unprepared  for Emmet's  rebellion  in Ireland. 
109 Durey, 'Escape of Sir Sidney Smith', pp. 456-7; Jean Hyde de Neuville, Mlemoires  et  souvenirs 
du  Baron  Hyde  de  Neuville  (Paris, I888). The reports  of abbe Ratel (Julie  Caron)  are available in PRO 
FO 27/53. 
110 See Talbot to George Hammond, 20  May i802, enclosed Note B, dated Downing Street, 
20 Feb. i8oi,  PRO HDi/i. 
11  Grenville to Talbot, 21  Mar. 1799,  MS Talbot, b.27, fo. 68; D. Hailes to Grenville, 9 Dec. 
1799,  Dropmore  papers, vi,  p.  64;  Grenville  to Talbot,  28 Feb.  i800,  MS  Talbot,  c.I6,  fo.  i. 
112 Talbot  to Grenville, 19 Feb.,  private draft, in lemon juice,  25 Aug.  1799, private and 
confidential  draft,  MS  Talbot,  b.27,  fos.  37-9,  io6-  0o. 
113  Talbot to Wickham, 29 Mar. 1803,  HRO  38M49/5/36/3. 
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